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A SOCIO-LEGAL METHODOLOGY FOR THE
INTERNAL/EXTERNAL DISTINCTION:

JURISPRUDENTIAL IMPLICATIONS
Brian Z. Tamanaha*
INTRODUCTION

In his hearing to become the next U.S. Supreme Court Justice, thenJudge Samuel Alito's opening statement before the Senate Judiciary
Committee contained the following passage:
When I became a judge, I stopped being a practicing attorney, and that
was the big change in role. The role of a practicing attorney is to achieve
a desirable result for the client in the particular case at hand. But a judge
can't think that way. A judge can't have any agenda. A judge can't have

any preferred outcome in any particular case.
doesn't have a client.

And a judge certainly

The judge's only obligation-and it's a solemn

obligation-is to the rule of law, and what that means
is that in every
1
single case, the judge has to do what the law requires.

This statement was reminiscent of Chief Justice John Roberts's assertion
2
that as a Justice he will "call balls and strikes."
From liberal quarters, Alito's statement was dismissed as "empty
platitudes." 3 Among academics it is widely thought that Supreme Court
decision making is largely the product of the political views of the Justices.
A recent book by Lee Epstein and Jeffrey A. Segal, political scientists who

have conducted leading studies of judicial decision making, approvingly
quotes a pioneer in the field, C. Herman Pritchett, "that judges 'are
influenced by their own biases and philosophies, which to a large degree
predetermine the position they will take on a given question. Private

* Benjamin N. Cardozo Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law.

1. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr. to be an Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 109th Cong. 56 (2006) [hereinafter Alito Confirmation Hearing] (statement of
Samuel A. Alito, Jr.).
2. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice
of the United States: HearingBefore the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,109th Cong. 56 (2005)
(statement of John G. Roberts, Jr.).
3. See, e.g., Andrew Cohen, All the Pretty Words, CBSNews.com, Jan. 10, 2006,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/01 / I0/opinion/courtwatch/mainI 198665.shtml.
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attitudes, in other words, become public law.' 4 Judge Richard Posner, one
of the nation's most prominent theorists and judges (and not a liberal),
wrote a review of the Rehnquist Court's final term. In that review entitled
A Political Court, Posner declared that "[t]he evidence of the influence of
policy judgments, and hence of politics, on constitutional adjudication in
the Supreme Court lies everywhere at hand."'5 Two leading constitutional
law scholars, Jack Balkin and Sanford Levinson, have articulated a theory
of "partisan entrenchment,"' 6 which holds that many constitutional
provisions are often open to different interpretations, so the particular
interpretation that prevails at any given moment is the product of political
struggles among groups within society, filtered through the constraints of
shared interpretive constitutional conventions.
This first kind of skepticism about Judge Alito's statement derives from
the belief that the Supreme Court as an institution routinely makes political
decisions. Strong evidence for this belief can be found in the many divided
decisions issued by the Court that fall along predictable political lines and
in the political science studies which show a strong correlation between the
judges' ideological views and their legal decisions. 7 Various reasons are
given to explain this inevitable political component of Supreme Court
decision making. The rarefied questions that reach this Court frequently
have no clear legal answer, so Justices must draw on other sources to make
the decision. Law as a general matter often invites political interpretations
in this sense; many of the cases heard by the Supreme Court are politically
charged and Justices cannot completely suppress their awareness and
consideration of the political implications. Justices in some instances
consciously decide cases on political grounds, regardless of what they say,
and all Justices subconsciously see the law through the lens of their
ideological beliefs, which shape their legal interpretations. 8 Given this
reality, Alito's statement, which appears to deny that politics matter, seems
either naYve or insincere.
A different basis for skepticism is focused not on the Supreme Court as
an institution, but on then-Judge Alito's judicial decisions. Senator Charles
Schumer questioned his commitment to follow the law: "Judge Alito, you
give the impression of being a meticulous legal navigator, but in the end

4. Lee Epstein & Jeffrey A. Segal, Advice and Consent: The Politics of Judicial
Appointments 3 (2005) (quoting C. Herman Pritchett, Divisions of Opinion Among Justices
of the U.S. Supreme Court, 1939-1941, 35 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 890, 890 (1941)).
5. Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court 2004 Term; Foreword: A Political Court,

119 Harv. L. Rev. 31, 46 (2005).
6. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Processes of Constitutional
Change: From PartisanEntrenchment to the National Surveillance State, 75 Fordham L.

Rev. 489 (2006).
7. See Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal
Model Revisited (2002).
8. See generally Epstein & Segal, supra note 4; Posner, supra note 5.
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you always seem to chart a right-ward course." 9 Judge Alito, Schumer
implicitly charged, consciously or subconsciously manipulates the law in
his legal decisions to advance a conservative agenda. This suspicion is lent
additional weight by President George W. Bush's promise to nominate a
committed conservative to the bench on the heels of the Harriet Miers
nomination debacle, which went down in a storm of opposition from his
supporters because she lacked solid conservative credentials (and was
unqualified).' 0
These two skeptical views of Alito's observations, while agreeing that
Alito will move the law in a conservative direction, have contrary thrusts.
The first view suggests that it is absurd to insist that the law alone
determines outcomes, not politics, because that is simply not how the
Supreme Court and constitutional law work. The second view suggests that
the law should decide cases, as Alito claims it will, but there are reasons to
suspect that he will improperly twist, consciously or subconsciously, the
law to serve the conservative political agenda. The second view accepts the
rule-of-law ideal that Alito espouses, but does not believe that he will live
up to it, while the first view rejects the ideal as unrealistic or even false with
respect to the Supreme Court.
Conservatives effectively parry both skeptical positions. They assume a
stance in the defense of the rule of law and Alito's commitment to uphold
it, and insist, accordingly, that inquiries about his personal political views
are irrelevant and amount to improper politicization of the judicial selection
process." Reassured by his stellar conservative credentials, meanwhile,
they optimistically expect that Alito will indeed interpret the law in a way
that furthers the conservative agenda. Engaging in a nimble dance,
conservatives rebut the first skeptical view as an unprincipled politicization
and denial of the rule of law. They also reject the second skeptical view of
Alito's promise to uphold the rule of law as baseless, while silently (with a
wink) accepting the shared underlying point of both skeptical views: that
Alito's political views will point his legal decisions in a conservative
direction.
There is a different way to approach Alito's observations that accepts
them at face value. Alito's statements can be considered as a standard
recitation of the contrast between the internal role orientation of legal
practice and that of the practice of judging. Understood in this way, Alito
was not offering an abstract statement that judges mechanistically decide
cases based upon strict fidelity to the law-so strongly worded as to appear

9. Alito Confirmation Hearing, supra note 1, at 37 (statement of Sen. Charles E.
Schumer, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary).
10. See Elizabeth Bumiller, White House Tries to Quell a Rebellion on the Right, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 7, 2005, at A20; David D. Kirkpatrick, New Questionsfrom the Right on Court
Pick, N.Y. Times, Oct. 6, 2005, at Al.
11. See David D. Kirkpatrick, On Party Lines, PanelApproves Alito for Court: Heated
Debate in Senate; Republicans Threaten to Retaliate on Nominees from Democrats, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 25, 2006, at Al.
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implausible.
Rather, he was identifying and contrasting a defining
characteristic of each respective practice. Seen in this way, his statement is
anything but naive or dubious; indeed, it is a descriptively correct
observation (though whether he is sincere in his commitment to live up to it
remains an open question).
This observation perhaps seems mundane. The point is to show how a
simple shift in the frame of reference of a statement throws it in a different
light. Similar shifts with respect to other puzzling issues can sometimes
open up a more fruitful way of thinking about problems in jurisprudence
and ethics, and in rendering evaluations of the conduct of lawyers and
judges. By systematically focusing on a handful of basic inquiries-What
are we looking at (and from what position are we looking)? What activities
are the people we are looking at engaged in? What do they think they are
doing? What are they actually doing?-new angles can be taken on old
issues. The internal/external distinction helps accomplish this. To set up
this approach, a few core working sociological notions will be quickly
sketched.
I. Two

CONTRASTING ORIENTATIONS OF A JUDGE

Before getting to that, consider the following contrast, which takes off
from Judge Alito's statement. Imagine two judges, both with politically
conservative personal views:
One decides cases with a conscious
orientation that strives to abide by the binding dictates of legal rules to
come up with the strongest legal interpretation in each case, without respect
to outcome (the consciously bound judge, or CB); a second judge decides
cases with a conscious orientation that strives to achieve ideologically
preferred ends in each case, and interprets and manipulates the legal rules to
whatever extent necessary to achieve the ends desired (the consciously
ends-oriented judge, or CEO).
Four realistic conditions must be added to this scenario.
First,
notwithstanding this conscious orientation, the CB is influenced by and sees
the law through background personal views; the legal interpretations of the
CB are thus not completely free of political influences in this subconscious
sense. Second, the CEO is not able to achieve ends with complete disregard
for conventional legal understandings because the decisions must be
plausible according to legal conventions; the legal interpretations of the
CEO are thus legally constrained in this sense. Third, in a large (but not
total) subset of cases, the legal rules allow for more than one plausible
outcome, though usually one outcome can be ranked as more legally
compelling than the others. Finally, in a subset of cases the legal rules are
so completely open that a decision requires that a judgment be made based
upon nonlegal factors. Note the realism of these conditions, which deny a
mechanistic view ofjudicial decision making.
Now, imagine that, in a given case, both judges arrive at precisely the
same outcome, supported by identical written decisions. Had they been
sitting together on a panel, they would have joined opinions. They were led
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to the same result and used the same reasoning because both judges utilized
the same theory of constitutional interpretation. The difference is that the
CB settled upon this theory as the correct way to interpret the Constitution
following a sincere and exhaustive study of constitutional law, whereas the
CEO settled upon the theory because it tends to support the outcomes the
judge prefers, and the CEO is willing to depart from or "adjust" the theory
if necessary to achieve the desired end in other cases.
Would we evaluate the judges' respective decisions, otherwise identical,
as equivalent? They are literally identical in external form and in
consequence. Some people might be inclined to take the position that this
is enough to make them equivalent in essential respects. To forestall this
view, consider the implications of the difference over time: Though in the
immediate case the judges' respective decisions are identical, in the run of
decisions over their careers, owing to their differing orientations, there
would be a divergence between these judges in legal reasoning and in
outcomes. Furthermore, compare a legal system in which all the judges are
CBs against a system in which all of the judges are CEOs; although in
external form they would look the same-decisions supported by legal
reasoning and terminology-these would be radically different systems.
Returning to the original scenario, I would argue that these externally
identical decisions are not equivalent. The CB's decision is faithfully lawabiding while the CEO's decision is an abusive exercise of power in the
guise of law. Note that the sole difference between these opinions is the
contrasting internalorientations of the judges. The CB's comports with the
ideal view of the proper judicial role, whereas the CEO's violates this ideal.
Only by taking an internal view can we get at this essential distinction.
II.

SOCIOLOGICAL CONCEPTS FOR THE INTERNAL/EXTERNAL DISTINCTION

A. The Postivism-InterpretivismDivide
The internal/external distinction is often referred to in contemporary legal
discussions, but with different references and usages.
H.L.A. Hart
introduced the internal point of view of legal officials in jurisprudence,
which he contrasted with a variety of external positions (as will be
discussed later). Legal historians debate whether the 1937 "constitutional
revolution" was the product of the "internal" development of constitutional
doctrine or the product of "external" political factors, including the pressure
on the Supreme Court brought by President Roosevelt's Court-packing
plan. 12 Political scientists characterize law professors and judges as
seduced by the "internal" view that judges decide cases according to law,
and take the alternative view that the "external" personal attitudes of judges

12. See G. Edward White, Constitutional Change and the New Deal:
Internalist/ExternalistDebate, 110 Am. Hist. Rev. 1094 (2005).
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determine their legal decisions.1 3 Despite these differences, a common
element shared by these distinctions is that the "internal" position in each
insists that the point of view of the actors must be taken into consideration
in one sense or another.
In the social sciences, the internal/external distinction aligns with the
interpretivism/positivism divide. 14 To state it summarily, the positivist
model of the social sciences aspires to emulate the goals, techniques, and
achievements of the natural sciences. Positivists strive to formulate
reliable, objective laws of human behavior based upon observable patterns,
invariant structures, or entrenched social relationships. These objective
findings, similar to the natural sciences, allow social scientists to explain
social phenomena and to make reliable predictions about future social
behavior.
Just as the natural sciences rely upon mathematics and
measurement, which are precise, repeatable, and confirmable, the primary
tools of positivist social science involve quantification and statistical
analysis. Only through objective inquiry that leads to the identification of
laws or patterns can the social sciences be truly scientific, according to this
view. Behavioralists, functionalists, and structuralists in different ways
strive to meet these goals. 15 From the standpoint of positivists, the
subjective ideas and motivations of individuals are irrelevant, or at least can
be bracketed and ignored.
Subjectivity is considered inaccessible,
unobservable, unreliable, and thus a shaky foundation for science;
moreover, when the goal is identifying social laws or explaining social
behavior, subjectivity is epiphenomenal-social actions have social causes.
Today these positivist ideas sound a bit old fashioned, and perhaps
extreme. But they still have champions. Donald Black, a prominent legal
sociologist, has written a number of influential books that purport to
identify "laws" that explain and predict legal behavior based upon the
identification of empirical regularities. 16 Black claims that the laws he
identifies are universal and unchanging. His legal sociology is avowedly
"pure" in the sense that it completely ignores human subjectivity. "My
work ... contains no psychology whatsoever and entirely eliminates the
individual from its formulations.... Consider, for example, the principle
stated earlier: Law varies directly with relationaldistance. It contains no
assumptions, assertions, or implications about the human mind or even

13. See Stephen M. Feldman, The Rule of Law or the Rule of Politics? Harmonizingthe
Internaland External Views of Supreme Court Decision Making, 30 Law & Soc. Inquiry 89
(2005).
14. For an overview of these approaches, see Brian Z. Tamanaha, Realistic Socio-Legal
Theory: Pragmatism and a Social Theory of Law, at ch. 3 (1997).
15. See generally James Bohman, New Philosophy of Social Science: Problems of
Indeterminacy (1991).
16. See, e.g., Donald Black, The Behavior of Law (1976); Donald Black, Sociological
Justice (1989).
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human beings as such."' 17 His sociology "ignores what people think' 18and
feel. It ignores their goals and preferences. It ignores their intentions."
Interpretivist social scientists emerged in reaction to positivists. They
disputed the proposition that the natural sciences are the appropriate model
for the social sciences. Unlike the insensate material that makes up the
natural world, intentional, meaningful actions underlie and give rise to
social behavior. Social sciences that ignore this intentional aspect miss this
core element. They are impoverished and doomed to explanatory failure,
since they fail to consider an essential causal factor in individual and social
behavior. Rather than look for invariant social laws-which have never
been found anyway-the social scientist should strive to understand and
explain the social behavior by attending to the meaningfulness that infuses
the behavior.
Max Weber and Peter Winch were pioneers of this approach. Weber
insisted that the "specific task of sociology must be the interpretation of
action in terms of its subjective meaning."' 19 Anthony Kronman explained
Weber's approach: "Only if a sociologist can see the world from the
perspective of their values, and appreciate what these values mean to them,
can he explain how the behaviour of his subjects is influenced by the values
they hold and construct an empirical causal explanation of the sort he seeks
to provide." 20 Weber still hoped to identify causal laws, but Peter Winch's
The Idea of a Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy completely
rejected the natural science model. ""Understanding,"' Winch wrote, "is
grasping the point or meaning of what is being done or said. This is a
notion far removed from the world of statistics and causal laws: it is closer
to the realm of discourse and to the internal relations that link the parts of a
realm of discourse." 2 1 Access to the point or meaning of what is going on
is available by attention to the "form of life"-the socially generated and
shared webs of meaning within which the social action takes place. The job
of the sociologist or anthropologist is to interpret the social action in light of
this intersubjective meaning.
Winch carefully qualified his position. He affirmed that a scientist can
describe a belief without personally endorsing it. "I do not mean, of course,
that it is impossible to take as a datum that a certain person, or group of
people, holds a certain belief-say that the earth is flat-without
subscribing to it oneself."' 22 His point was rather that the logic of this belief
and a proper understanding of what it means must, in the first instance, be
assessed within the context of its form of life. Winch's work, it should be

17. Donald Black, The Epistemology of Pure Sociology, 20 Law & Soc. Inquiry 829,
849 (1995).

18. Id. at 866.
19. Tamanaha, supra note 14, at 157 (citing Max Weber, The Theory of Social and
Economic Organization 88 (1964)).

20. Anthony T. Kronman, Max Weber 16-17 (1983).
21. Peter Winch, The Idea of a Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy 115 (1958).
22. Id. at 110.
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noted, is particularly relevant to jurisprudence because H.L.A. Hart, who
introduced the internal point of view into the jurisprudential discussion,
23
explicitly identified his view of the internal aspect of rules with Winch's.
The internal/external distinction in the social sciences is connected to this
broader debate. Positivists take an external view of patterns of social action
that ignores the intentions and meanings of the social actors; interpretivists
take an internal view of the social actions that take cognizance of the
meanings of and for the actors. An example of this distinction in the legal
context is the contrast between legal explanations for judicial decisions and
the statistical studies conducted by political scientists which ignore these
internal explanations and instead correlate patterns of decision making with
factors like personal ideology. 24 The former take seriously the meaningful
actions of the actors, while the latter, relying upon a purely external view of
decisions, offer a competing causal explanation. In this example, the
external position describes a methodological approach-bracketing the
internal view of judges and identifying patterns in their decisions. The
explanation offered by political scientists, however, is ultimately grounded
in the meaningful realm as well, since it points to the personal attitudes of
judges. In this respect their methodological positivism is unlike Black's
epistemological positivism. But both of these versions of positivism ignore
the conscious orientation of the actors.
B. DistinguishingTwo Internal/ExternalAxes: Observed and Observers
So far we have identified one key internal/external axis, which focuses on
how the subjects being observed are to be examined: taking account of
their meaningful actions (internal), or ignoring their meaningful actions in
lieu of attention to patterns of action (external). But in the legal context
there is another important internal/external axis: focusing on the persons
doing the observations. In the social scientific discussion, the status of the
observers is generally ignored because the presumption is that only social
scientists are qualified observers. Only social scientists have the training
and necessary objective bearing (oriented to getting the facts right) to
conduct social scientific studies; indeed participants are thought to be
disqualified from observer status because they lack sufficient distancing
from the activity to be able to view it in a detached fashion.
The discussion of internal and external perspectives in the legal context is
more complicated because many of the most influential legal theorists and
legal observers have been judges, from Oliver Wendell Holmes to
Benjamin Cardozo to Richard Posner. Owing to their position as actors
within the system, their work is the product of persons situated internally.
It is as if witch doctors from a tribe studied by an anthropologist wrote their

23. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 289 (2d ed. 1994) (citing Winch, supra note 21, at
57, 65, 84-94).
24. See generally Feldman, supra note 13, at 89.
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own accounts of the operation of magic that competed with those writings
produced by the anthropologist.
A more immediate reason why the legal discussion of the
internal/external distinction is complicated is that the most influential
expositor of the internal/external distinction in law, Hart, injected a fatal
point of confusion in his initial articulation of the distinction, which he
never cleared up. The seminal paragraph on this distinction in his classic
The Concept of Law begins,
The following contrast again in terms of the "internal" and "external"
aspect of rules may serve to mark what gives this distinction its great
importance for the understanding not only of law but of the structure of
any society. ...[Flor it is possible to be concerned with the rules, either
merely as an observer who does not himself accept them, or as a member
of the group which accepts and uses them as guides to conduct. We may
25
call these respectively the "external" and the "internal points of view."
In this passage, Hart specifically identifies the observer as a person outside
the group, who is in that sense "external." The status of the observer, as
indicated earlier, was not an issue in the social science discussion, so this
usage of "external" was not developed but presupposed.
A second sense of external suggested by Hart in the very same passage is
that the external observer can recognize the norms of the group without
committing to them; here he was picking up on Winch's point that a
scientist can understand a tribal belief that the earth is flat without
subscribing to that belief. This usage is also idiosyncratic to Hart. For
Winch, the opposite of trying to understand the form of life of a group
(internal), which he advocated, is not paying attention to the form of life of
the group (external), which he rejected. The latter point-Winch's
"external"-is logically and substantively different from the issue of
whether the observer agrees with or rejects any particular beliefs within the
form of life. Thus far Hart has used "external" in two senses-(l) the
situation of the observer, and (2) whether the observer accepts the beliefs of
the actors-neither of which are standard usages in the social sciences.
In the below passage, which immediately follows the one quoted above,
Hart carries over these two senses of the internal/external distinction, but
then he adds the standard methodological meaning from the social sciences
(observing patterns of action and using these to make predictions). Hart
explicitly acknowledges that he uses several different understandings of
external, without bothering to clarify their relations:
Statements made from the external point of view may themselves be of
different kinds. For the observer may, without accepting the rules
himself, assert that the group accepts the rules, and thus may from outside
refer to the way in which they are concerned with them from the internal
point of view. But whatever the rules are, whether they are those of
games, like chess or cricket, or moral or legal rules, we can if we choose
25. Hart, supra note 23, at 88-89.
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occupy the position of an observer who does not even refer in this way to
the internal point of view of the group. Such an observer is content
merely to record the regularities ...in the form of the hostile reaction,
reproofs, or punishments, with which deviations from the rules are met.
After a time the external observer may, on the basis of the regularities
observed, correlate deviation with hostile reaction, and be able to predict
with a fair measure of success, and to assess the chances that a deviation
normal behaviour will meet with hostile reaction or
from the group's
26
punishment.
This passage contains a crucial equivocation. In the second sentence, the
external orientation still refers mainly to the status of the "observer" as
someone "outside" the group. In the third, fourth, and fifth sentences, Hart
carries over this first meaning, but also adds a new angle on the external
orientation, that is, whether the external patterns of behavior of the subjects
alone will be examined and identified (and used to make predictions), or
whether the meaning for the actors will also be considered. With this last
reference, Hart finally hit upon the familiar internal/external distinction in
the social sciences. But then Hart compounded this mess of inconsistent
references by likening the external view of an outsider to the internal view
of a member of the group who does not accept the rules:
The external point of view may very nearly reproduce the way in
which the rules function in the lives of certain members of the group,
namely those who reject its rules and are only concerned with them when
they judge that unpleasant consequences are likely to follow
and because
27
violation.
Hart made unannounced shifts between various meanings of internal/
external. He began with this combination: an observer outside the group
(external) versus participant in the group (internal); and an outsider who
does not accept (external) versus insider who accepts (internal). Then he
moved to a completely different meaning: examining patterns of behavior
The
(external) versus understanding meaning for actors (internal).
confusion this generated for readers is manifest in the reaction of Joseph
Raz and Neil MacCormick. Raz observed that the Hart internal/external
divide tended "to obscure from sight the existence of a third category of
statements;" 2 8 MacCormick likewise noted that there are "three distinct
points of view, not a simple internal/external dichotomy." 29 As evidence of
the mess Hart created, however, Raz and MacCormick each offered a
different third position, Raz focusing on uncommitted participants and
MacCormick focusing on uncommitted observers. Hart later agreed with
"Such detached statements constitute a third kind of
the criticism:
statement to add to the two (internal and external statements) which I

26.
27.
28.
29.

Id. at 89.
Id. at 90.
Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality 155 (1979).
Neil MacCormick, H.L.A. Hart 39 (1981).
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distinguish. ' 30 After this unelaborated adjustment, Hart left jurisprudence
with internal and external statements in an unspecified relationship with
detached and committed statements (which makes four potential positions,
not three).
The wrong turn made by Hart, from which multiple confusions have
resulted, 3 1 was his erroneous initial identification as an aspect of the
internal/external distinction the acceptance or nonacceptance of the
observer with respect to the beliefs of the group being examined. This is an
important issue, but it is not a way to distinguish internal from external, and
should not have been discussed in terms of this distinction. The basic
problem is that observers have more options than being detached and
committed, such as critical or ironic, and participants have more options as
well, so there is no way to construe the attitudes of either observers or
participants in terms of a simple internal/external dichotomy. Hart in effect
acknowledged this when he pulled it out as an unspecified third category.
Rather than step deeper into this morass, a basic table of the
internal/external distinction is set out below, drawing from the social
scientific and the legal discussion. One axis is based upon whether the
observer is someone internal to the practice or external to the practice-this
focuses on who is conducting the observations. A second axis is based on
whether that practice will be examined with attention to the internal
meaning of the participants or by f6cusing on their external patterns of
behavior alone-this focuses on how the group being observed will be
looked at. Using familiar examples, the below table is constructed around
accounts of the practice of judging.
INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL STUDIES OF THE PRACTICE OF JUDGING
OBSERVER
Participant Observer

Non-Participant Observer

OBSERVED

(Internal)

(External)

Meaningful Subject

Cardozo's JudicialProcess

Dworkin's Law's Empire

(Internal)

(Internal/Internal)

(External/Internal)

Political Science Attitudinal
Studies

Patterns of Behavior
(External)

(Internal/External)

(External/External)

30. H.L.A. Hart, Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy 14 (1983).
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The table is self-explanatory. Cardozo was a judge (internal) who wrote
about how judging is done from the standpoint of a judge (internal).
Dworkin is not a judge (external) and at least purported to write from the
standpoint of how a judge decides cases (internal). Political scientists who
conduct attitudinal studies are not judges (external) and examine patterns of
decisions in a manner that disregards the internal views of judges (external).
The internal/external box is left blank because it is unusual for a participant
to take a purely external view of an activity, which is an odd posture to
assume, and no one fits this category perfectly. Perhaps one person who at
times qualifies is Judge Posner, who observed, "I am denying that judicial
introspection, and a fortiori judges' avowals concerning the nature of
judicial decision making, are good explanations for judicial action." 32 He is
an insider who rejects the insider view of judging (oddly, since Posner is a
judge this statement situates him in a variant of the liar's paradox), and
gives more credence to political scientists' external attitudinal studies.
C. Practices,Institutions, and Interpretive Communities
To fill out the sociological concepts that will help draw the internalexternal distinction, three additional ideas will be quickly sketched. The
notion of a practice has received much attention in social theory and the
social sciences. There are prominent contemporary philosophical and
sociological exponents of the idea, including Alasdair Maclntyre, Stanley
Fish, and Pierre Bourdieu. 33 The basic idea is that practices involve an
activity that consists of shared, often tacit ways of knowing and doing.
Maclntyre put it this way:
By a "practice" I am going to mean any coherent and complex form of
socially established cooperative human activity through which goods
internal to that form of activity are realized in the course of trying to
achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and
partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that human
powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and
goods involved, are systematically extended. Tic-tac-toe is not an
example of a practice in this sense, nor is throwing a football with skill;
but the game of football is, and so is chess. Bricklaying is not a practice;
architecture is. Planting turnips is not a practice; farming is. So are the
enquiries of physics, chemistry and biology, and so is the work of the
historian, and so are painting and music.... Thus the range of practices
is wide: arts, sciences, games, politics in the Aristotelian 34sense, the
making and sustaining of family life, all fall under the concept.

31. For a comprehensive reconstruction of Hart's approach, see Brian Z. Tamanaha, A
General Jurisprudence of Law and Society, at ch. 6 (2001).
32. Richard A. Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence 189 (1990).
33. See generally Stephen Turner, The Social Theory of Practices: Tradition, Tacit
Knowledge, and Presuppositions (1994).
34. Alasdair Maclntyre, After Virtue 187-88 (2d ed. 1984).
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MacIntyre struggles to pin down this elusive idea. And his examples need
not be taken as authoritative-bricklaying surely has its own techniques and
standards of excellence.
A concise formulation of his idea is that practices involve socially
established activities which have their own integrated knowledge, ways of
doing, and standards of excellence. "To enter into a practice is to accept the
authority of those standards and the inadequacy of my own performance as
judge by them," wrote Maclntyre. "It is to subject my own attitudes,
choices, preferences and tastes to standards which currently and partially
define the practice." 35 Or as Stanley Fish put it, "To think within a practice
is to have one's very perception and sense of possible and appropriate
action issue 'naturally'-without further reflection-from one's position as
'36
a deeply situated agent."
Maclntyre also usefully clarifies the distinction between practices and
institutions: "Chess, physics and medicine are practices; chess clubs,
laboratories, universities and hospitals are institutions. ' 37 Practices are
often supported by institutions, such that "institutions and practices
characteristically form a single causal order," 38 but they remain distinct
notions.
It should be emphasized that the notion of a practice, at least in my
usage, is a heuristic or framing device, a way of marking off discrete fields
for the purposes of inquiry. Offered with no larger pretensions, it is a
flexible way of focusing on and distinguishing activities that operate at
different levels of generality. Practicing law is a different practice from
judging, and both of these practices are yet different from doing legal
theory. Legal theory is usually done within academic institutions; judging
is done within court institutions; and practicing law is done within law
firms, government institutions, or in solo practice. Sub-practices can also
be identified as nesting within broader practices or distinct from other
versions of related practices. Appellate judging is different from trial
judging, as is state judging from federal judging, though they share
common elements. Tax practice is different from criminal defense practice,
from corporate law practice, from criminal prosecution practice, and so
forth. These activities are comprised of their own particular bodies of
knowledge and standards of excellence, though again they share elements
with related or more general practices.
The notion of a practice provides a useful way to organize the
internal/external distinction by providing an answer to the threshold
question: internal or external with respect to what? The table in the
previous part was constructed around observations with respect to the
practice of judging, but the same table can be filled in with respect to the
35.
36.
Theory
37.

Id. at 190.
Stanley Fish, Doing What Comes Naturally:
in Literary and Legal Studies 386-87 (1989).
Maclntyre, supra note 34, at 181.

38. Id.

Change, Rhetoric, and the Practice of
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practice of law (or around some sub-practice thereof), or any other legal
practice. The internal/external distinction need not be drawn with respect to
practices-for Winch it was "forms of life;" Hart referred to members of a
social group, and to legal officials-but in the legal context this is often a
helpful way to frame the question, as later parts will show.
A final useful idea, developed by Stanley Fish, is interpretive
community. 39 Interpretive communities are people who share in socially
generated and transmitted clusters of meaning-complexes of ideas, beliefs,
knowledge, symbols, and terminology or language that characterize discrete
groups. The conventions of the interpretive community help stabilize
meaning for its members. All trained lawyers share indoctrination into the
interpretive community of a given legal tradition, usually transmitted in the
course of undergoing legal education. Lawyers, judges, and academics are
members of the interpretive legal community, which allows them to
communicate (and there are more specialized subcommunities of legal
knowledge as well).
A practice is not limited to the realm of meaning-it involves doing,
engaging in a discrete activity that integrates meaning and behavior. But
practices have a close relationship with interpretive communities. People
who have not been indoctrinated into the legal interpretive community can
function as practicing lawyers, but they will experience some difficulty, at
least initially. A narrow and routine legal practice (like residential real
estate transactions) can be picked up through tutelage in the practice, but
more complex legal activities require membership in the interpretive legal
community, which can only be gained through immersion in its meaning
and conventions.
These three concepts focus on different aspects of a social arena. For
example, when judges engage in judging (practice), they do so within a
broader judicial system (institution), and are informed by the knowledge
and language of their legal tradition (interpretive legal community). To
demonstrate the usefulness of this handful of sociological concepts in
drawing and exploring the internal/external distinction, the remainder of
this essay will briefly take up a few questions in jurisprudence, and will end
by returning to the Alito statement set forth at the outset.
III.

UNTANGLING A COUPLE OF JURISPRUDENTIAL PUZZLES

A. Holmes 's Prediction Theory of Law
In The Path of the Law, when posing the question "What is the law?,"
"The
Holmes offered an answer that continues to puzzle readers:
prophesies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious,

39. See generally Stanley Fish, Is There a Text in This Class?

Interpretive Communities (1980).

The Authority of
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are what I mean by the law." 40 An easy rebuttal points out the absurdity of
Holmes's answer: When applied to judges, it suggests that judges are
engaged in predicting their own behavior.
But this rebuttal is easily countered by paying attention to the relevant
practice at issue. The article was an address to graduating law students at
Boston University, the theme of which was that the practice of law is 4a1
business (itself a scandalous idea at the time, but one repeated by others).
Holmes's observations were about what it is like to be a practicing
lawyer-offering comments on the internal views of lawyering, if you will.
The second sentence of the essay made clear his orientation: "We are
studying what we shall want in order to appear before judges, or to advise
people in such a way as to keep them out of court."' 42 Confusion continues
to arise because critics of Holmes interpret "What is the law?" not as a
question posed with respect to the internal view of a practicing lawyer, but
instead as a classic question perennially debated in legal theory (itself a
discrete practice), or as a question posed by a judge when presiding over a
case. In the latter two contexts his answer would be indeed absurd; in the
former context it is indisputably correct.
A related controversy, also easy to dispel, surrounds Holmes's
observations about the "bad man." 4 3 His point was that the immediate and
most pressing concern most clients will have for a practicing lawyer relates
to the legal consequences they face in connection with their actions. The
lawyer's job is to offer a reliable prediction of how the law (courts,
specifically) will respond. When referring to the "bad man," Holmes was
not making normative or descriptive observations or claims about the views
of citizenry towards law, or anything of the sort; again, these are the kinds
of questions that occupy legal and political theorists. Indeed, rather than
use the "bad man" example (which had a provocative ring), Holmes could
have made the very same point using the "good woman" client inquiring
about the enforceability of a real estate sales contract. In either case, and in
all cases, clients consulting lawyers want to know how the law will treat
their conduct. Viewed from this standpoint, in connection with the role of a
practicing lawyer, Holmes's observations, which have so often troubled
theorists, are obvious rather than controversial.
B. The Hart/DworkinDispute
In his postscript to the second edition of The Concept of Law, Hart
objected to Ronald Dworkin's "imperialistic" view of legal theory.
"Dworkin appears to rule out general and descriptive legal theory as

40. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 461 (1897).

41. See Brian Z. Tamanaha, Law as a Means to an End: Threat to the Rule of Law, at
ch. 3 (2006).
42. Holmes, supra note 40, at 457.
43. Id. at 460.
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misguided or at best simply useless." 44 Dworkin is less than clear about
why general, descriptive legal theory is inappropriate. His basic argument
seems to be that legal theory is always internal to law as a purposive
activity, which precludes legal theory from being general (divorced from
any particular legal system), and which requires that legal theory be
normative (to advance the purposes of the legal system). 45 Along these
lines, Dworkin asserts that "no firm line divides
jurisprudence from
46
adjudication or any other aspect of legal practice."
Against Dworkin's assertion, using the concepts set out earlier, it is a
simple matter to demonstrate clear dividing lines. Judging and doing legal
theory are separate practices that have different standards of excellence,
different foci, take place in different institutions with different objectives,
and are subject to different demands and constraints, resources, venues, and
consequences. A brilliant work in legal theory is markedly different in
form and content from a brilliant judicial opinion. A terrible piece of legal
theory will be ignored (or not published), whereas a terrible judicial
decision will have concrete consequences for the parties which can be
devastating (even if later overturned). It is correct that judges and legal
theorists are members of the same interpretive legal community, which
allows them to communicate and produces overlapping concerns; but this
does not diminish the fact that they are involved in completely separate and
very different practices.
When Dworkin mused about the internal view of judging in the luxury of
his university office, drawing up his model philosophical-judge Hercules,
he was engaged in the practice of legal theory, not in judging (to state the
obvious). Many judges would say, as Judge Harry Edwards did, that
Dworkin's observations bear little resemblance to the actual practice of
judging and for that reason have little of value to offer judges. 47 When
Judge Benjamin Cardozo wrote about judging (in a far more realistic
fashion than Dworkin, not coincidentally), participating in the legal theory
discussion, he was not actively judging but was reflecting upon judging
informed by his experience in the practice. 48 This distinction helps explain
an apparent inconsistency between Cardozo's candid acknowledgment of
the moments of discretion called for in judging, compared to his beautifully
crafted judicial decisions which conceal the discretionary decisions he made
as a judge. The conventions and standards of the respective practicestheorizing about law versus judging-shaped and constrained how and what
Cardozo could write about in each.
Once it is clear that the practice of judging is not even on a continuum
with the practice of jurisprudence-though participants are members of the
44. Hart, supra note 23, at 242.
45. Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire 13-14 (1986).
46. Id. at 90.
47. See Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the
Legal Profession,91 Mich. L. Rev. 34, 47 (1992).
48. See Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process (1921).
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same interpretive community and are part of the same legal traditionDworkin's denial of the value or appropriateness of Hart's general,
descriptive jurisprudence loses its import. Hart's jurisprudence is an
entirely legitimate sub-practice within legal theory (known as legal
philosophy or analytical jurisprudence). Legal theory is an academic
activity, and is governed and adjudged by the rules and norms of academic
production, norms which emphasize the production of valid knowledge.
Even if Hart's general and descriptive observations are completely useless
for those engaged in the practice of law or in judging (about which Hart had
little to say4 9), they are still important contributions to knowledge about
law.
IV. BACK TO THE CB

JUDGE AND THE

CEO JUDGE

Recall the scenario set out earlier in this essay, comparing the
consciously bound judge to the consciously ends-oriented judge, both of
whom, in a given case, happen to arrive at the same end on the same stated
legal grounds. From an external standpoint they are indistinguishable: In
explicit legal terms they are identical, and a social scientist would mark
them as identical. But if the internal standpoint is taken into consideration,
I asserted, the former is a paragon of judging while the latter is a usurper
who should be condemned. The basis for rendering this judgment is that
one of the defining characteristics of the practice of judging in our legal
tradition-its primary standard of excellence--is that judges consciously
strive to abide by the binding import of the legal rules and not decide cases
based upon their personal preferences. That is the point of "the rule of law,
not man." 50 Holmes, the ever-skeptical hero of the Legal Realists, said
"'[i]t has given me great pleasure to sustain the Constitutionality of laws
that I believe to be as bad as possible, because I thereby helped to mark the
difference between what I would forbid and what the Constitution
permits.
."'51 Holmes prided himself on his judicial capacity for "heroic
52
disinterestedness."
The skepticism of Posner, of political scientists, and of Balkin and
Levinson, who suggest that judging on the Supreme Court is essentially a
matter of politics (filtered through current legal conventions), fails to
sufficiently acknowledge the significance of this internal aspect of the
practice of judging. Such skeptics, particularly political scientists and often
Posner (though not Balkin and Levinson), suggest that the conscious
orientationof the judge is mostly irrelevant'because personal ideology will
influence interpretations of law unbeknownst to the good faith consciously

49. See Frederick Schauer, (Re)taking Hart, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 852 (2006) (reviewing
Nicola Lacey, A Life of H.L.A. Hart: The Nightmare and the Noble Dream (2004)).
50. Brian Z. Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory 122 (2004).
51. Louis Menand, The Metaphysical Club 67 (2001) (quoting Letter from Oliver
Wendell Holmes to John T. Morse (Nov. 28, 1926)).
52. Id. at 66.
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bound judge. To dismiss the significance of the internal views of the judges
is to obviate the distinction between the CB and the CEO.
The point here is not just that the CEO can be condemned from within
the standards of excellence of the practice of judging; it is more so that the
decisions over time produced by the CB and the CEO will differ, with
radical consequences for others and the system. To appreciate the full
parameters of this situation, imagine an entire system filled with CEOs.
Over time the practice of judging will change, and CEOs' conscious
attitudes will become the norm in the practice of judging. The new
standard of excellence for judging will involve the most artful achievement
of ends through legal reasoning. That would be an entirely different
system, one which can be adjudged "legal" in form only.
Skeptics who dismiss the significance of the conscious orientation of
judges toward being rule-bound miss this larger implication. They also fail
to consider whether their repeated claims that judging is politics might
hasten the day in which this is true, because everyone in the legal culture,
including judges, come to believe that it is true, and judges cease to be
consciously rule-bound, thinking it a naYve stance to assume. The risk of
this occurring is heightened in the current highly politicized atmosphere
surrounding judicial appointments at both the state and federal levels.
Since judges are openly selected (or rejected) based upon their political
views, 53 it would make sense for judges to think that their personal views
have a role to play.
A crucial mistake is commonly made in contemporary discussions of
judging. It is correct that judges' background views can shape their
interpretation of the law, and that this process is subconscious and at some
level unavoidable. It is also correct that sometimes the law runs out or calls
upon the making of discretionary judgments by judges. Too often,
however, an unwarranted jump is made from recognition of these points to
the conclusion that, therefore, judges are naYve or lying when they claim
that their decisions are determined by the law. To the extent that a judge is
in fact consciously rule-bound, the judge is unconditionally correct in
claiming to be rule-bound in the only sense that this can be humanly
achieved. Since judging is a human practice, it makes no sense to evaluate
the conduct of judges by reference to a standard that is impossible to
54
achieve, inevitably finding them wanting.
It is precisely this conscious orientation, and nothing else, that marks the
difference between a system filled with CB judges versus ones filled with
CEO judges, and it cannot be doubted that these are starkly different
systems. It is wrong for political scientists to Call all judges "'politicians in
black robes"' 55 when that label precisely fits CEO judges, but not CB

53. For an exploration of this politicization, see Tamanaha, supra note 41, at ch. 10.
54. This argument is developed more fully in id., at ch. 13.
55. Id. at 124 (quoting H.R. Glick, Courts, Politics, and Justice 243 (1983)).
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judges. Their loose application of this label to all judges eliminates the
capacity to make this important distinction.
This is not a rejection of the external point of view, but a suggestion that
it can be done better. At least in theory, political scientists should be able to
identify through their studies a baseline range of correlations between
judges' decisions and their attitudes that represents the level of unavoidable
subconscious influence. This baseline will differ depending on the court
(legal questions are more open and contestable at the Supreme Court level
compared to the appellate level, though it might be that trial courts also
have more discretion than appellate courts owing to the decisions entrusted
to their judgment). But for each level it should be possible to statistically
identify distinctions between judges who reason in CB terms and judges
who reason in CEO terms. Presumably the correlations between CEO
judges' decisions and their attitudes should be higher than that between CB
judges' decisions and their attitudes at each level of court. In this manner,
the external studies will offer a window into the internal conscious
orientation of judges.
The findings of such studies would offer important lessons for the
relationship between law and politics in judging. A liberal CB judge and a
conservative CB judge should agree on many decisions, and indeed studies
of appellate judging tend to support this argument (presuming most judges
are still CBs). 56 The agreement among conservative CEOs should be nigh
complete, and likewise among liberal CEOs. However, even among these
like-minded judges, the decisions will not line up every single time with
attitudes-sometimes the law so clearly points in the other direction that the
CEOs' attitudes cannot overcome it. There should also be a divergence in
decisions, attributable to the binding force of the law, between conservative
CBs and conservative CEOs and between liberal CBs and liberal CEOs.
Whatever else they show, these studies should demonstrate that the law
determines the decisions in a significant proportion of cases for judges who
are consciously bound to following the law. And that is essential to a ruleof-law system.
This would be an immensely complicated project, of course, and it is not
clear that it can be accomplished, but it would provide a valuable way to cut
through much of the rhetoric and confusion that pervades the subject of
judging and politics.

56. See Frank B. Cross, Decisionmaking in the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals, 91 Cal.
L. Rev. 1457 (2003); Cass R. Sunstein, David Schkade & Lisa Michelle Ellman, Ideological
Voting on Federal Courts of Appeals: A Preliminary Investigation, 90 Va. L. Rev. 301
(2004). Although the authors emphasize that ideological effects show up, they also

recognize that "[i]t would be possible to see our data as suggesting that most of the time, the
law is what matters, not ideology." Id. at 336.
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CONCLUSION: BACK TO ALITO

Alito's statement cited at the outset was an accurate description of the
differing conventions that characterize the practice of law and the practice
of judging. If Alito lives up to his description of the role of a judge, if he
behaves like a CB, he cannot be condemned, although liberals might not
like all the results. If Alito takes the bench and surreptitiously behaves like
a CEO, he deserves the condemnation of both conservatives (however much
they like the results) and liberals for betraying the practice of judging and
for betraying the legal system.
How will we know? Studies conducted by political scientists have found
that a few Justices, like Rehnquist and William 0. Douglas, show
remarkably high correlations-in the 95% range in civil rights casesbetween their decisions and their ideological preferences in certain classes
of cases. 57 Such extraordinarily high correlations raise a red flag that a
judge is reasoning in a CEO fashion, especially since other Justices show
lower correlations. It seems unlikely that a consciously bound reading of
the law would line up conservative or liberal in more than nine out of ten
times. Admittedly, this will not conclusively establish that a judge is
reasoning like a CEO, but it will be the best evidence available. If Alito's
decisions line up this way, as Senator Schumer suggested routinely occurs
in his appellate decisions, it is fair to surmise that he is reasoning like a
CEO.
Only one person will know for sure: Alito himself. Alito will experience
the pain of betraying the practice of judging and the legal system as a
whole, if he is truly committed to these ideals, every time his conscious
orientation downplays the binding force of law in lieu of consciously
striving to achieve ends in his decisions. His very articulation of the ideal
confirms his knowledge and acceptance of it as a governing standard for his
judicial conduct. No other constraint can be imposed on judges. In the end
it is left to the individual conscience of each judge.

57. See Tamanaha, supra note 14, at ch. 7.

